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LORENZO V.  SEC: BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN PRIMARY 
AND SECONDARY SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY 
Brian Elzweig* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In 2019, the Supreme Court decided Lorenzo Securities v. Securities 
Exchange Commission.1 Lorenzo held that a person can be held primarily 
liable for securities fraud if they disseminate a material misstatement in 
connection with the sale or purchase of securities, even if they did not 
originally make the statement2  In doing so, the Court expanded its 
previous holding in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, 
which held that a maker of a statement is the one who has ultimate 
authority over that statement.3 If all other elements of securities fraud are 
met, Lorenzo now allows for primary liability for making or 
disseminating a misrepresentation.4 This allows for primary liability for 
a secondary violation of the scheme liability provisions of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Securities Act)5 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act).6 Lorenzo’s impact on aiding and abetting claims under 
the securities laws will likely be decided in future cases. Aiding and 
abetting liability is limited to Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) enforcement actions and not allowed in private lawsuits.7￼ 
Allowing for assignment of primary liability to secondary actors will aid 
private rights of action for fraud, because private rights of action are 
allowed for primary violations of securities fraud. Lorenzo’s expansion of 
primary liability blurs the line between primary liability and secondary 
liability in securities fraud cases.  However, many questions as to the 
breadth of this expansion are left unanswered. The SEC will have 
expanded power in enforcement actions because it can charge more 
people as primary violators. Private rights of action for securities fraud 
will also be impacted. Private rights of action require more elements to 
make a prima facie case for fraud than does an SEC enforcement action. 
Two of these required elements—scienter and reliance—may be difficult 
to prove for private plaintiffs. This Article first examines the enactment 
 
 * Associate Professor of Business Law and Research Fellow of the Reubin O’Donovan Askew 
Institute of Multidisciplinary Studies at the University of West Florida. 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019). 
 2. Id. at 1099. 
 3. 564 U.S. 135, 137 (2011). 
 4. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1104. 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012). 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012). 
 7. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1103. 
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of securities fraud statutes. Next, this Article discusses the Lorenzo case’s 
effect on Janus. The Article then discusses how Lorenzo distinguishes 
and expands other cases. Finally, the Article discusses how future 
litigation in the areas of scienter and reliance will likely shape securities 
fraud jurisprudence in light of Lorenzo.  
II. THE ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE 
EXCHANGE ACT 
 In response to the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted major 
securities reforms to promote honesty and fairness in the United States 
securities markets.  One such reform was the Securities Act of 1933, 
which covers the initial issuance of securities to investors by requiring 
“full and fair disclosure of information to the public in the sales of [those] 
securities.”8  The following year, Congress promulgated the Exchange 
Act to regulate “post-distribution trading on the [n]ation’s stock 
exchanges and securities trading markets.”9 This regulation was designed 
to prevent fraudulent ongoing securities transactions after the initial 
offering of the securities to the public.10 Together the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act were implemented to restore faith in the securities 
markets after the crash.  
To aid enforcement of the provisions of the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act, each act added broad antifraud provisions.  Specifically, 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 are the major 
antifraud enforcement mechanisms.  
Rule 10b-5 states that it is: 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange,  
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.11 
The main antifraud provision in the Securities Act is Section 17(a), 
which states: 
 
 8. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988). 
 9. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975).  
 10. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018). 
 11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
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It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities … 
or any security-based swap agreement…by the use of any means or 
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or 
by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—  
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading; or 
 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.12 
 The SEC created rule 10b-5 by adapting the language of Section 
17(a).13 Courts have held that the two provisions require essentially the 
same elements because of their shared foundation in common law.14  
While these provisions are similar, however, there are some key 
differences between the two. Aaron v. SEC held that scienter is required 
to prove a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “regardless of the 
identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.”15 Actions under 
Section 17(a)(1) also require a finding of scienter; however, actions under 
section 17(a)(2) and (3) only require proof of negligence.16  Section 17(a) 
is more limited than Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 in that it only creates 
liability in SEC enforcement actions and does not allow for private rights 
of action.17 Section 10(b) and all of the subsections of Rule 10b-5 allow 
for SEC actions.18 Rule 10b-5(b) also allows for a private right of action. 
Lorenzo implies this private right of action is extended to cases brought 
under Rule 10b-5 subsections (a) and (c).  The relationship between the 
subsections of Rule 10b-5 is important due to the implications that 
Lorenzo has on allowing for private rights of action under  those 
subsections. Because of the similarity between the text of Rule 10b-5 and 
Section 17(a) they are often discussed together under the auspices of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  This Article discusses the two fraud 
provisions in a similar fashion, except in areas where the differences 
between the two are relevant.  
 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). 
 13. Andrew P. Arnold, Two Faces of Janus in the District Courts: Is Liability for Securities Fraud 
under Section 17(a) Limited to Actors with ”Ultimate Authority“ over Untrue Statements?, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 1054, 1064 (2013). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980). 
 16. Id. at 696.  
 17. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-71 (1979). 
 18. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975). 
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III. THE FACTS OF LORENZO 
The Court examined the relationship between Rule 10b-5’s subsections 
in Lorenzo.19 At issue in Lorenzo was whether a person could be liable 
for disseminating a false or misleading statement when that person was 
not the maker of the statement.20 Francis Lorenzo was the director of 
investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC (“Charles Vista”), a registered 
broker-dealer firm.21 Lorenzo’s only investment banking client at the time 
was Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc. (Waste2Energy),22 which was 
developed to turn solid waste into clean energy.23 Waste2Energy claimed 
to have developed gasification technology that generated electricity by 
converting solid waste to gas.24 In June of 2009, Waste2Energy filed a 
Form 8-K (“8-K”) with the SEC containing unaudited financial 
statements that claimed its total assets were worth around $14 million.25 
$10 million of this was attributed to intangible assets consisting mainly 
of intellectual property relating to the gasification process.26 
Waste2Energy’s business was modeled around its gasification 
technology, and the company faced financial ruin when its technology 
failed to live up to its potential.27 In September 2009, to combat its 
financial issues, Waste2Energy made an offering of up to $15 million of 
convertible debentures.28 In conjunction with the debentures, 
Waste2Energy issued a Private Placement Memorandum claiming that its 
intangibles were still worth $10 million.29 Charles Vista was hired as the 
sole placement agent for the debentures.30 Lorenzo later testified that he 
doubted Waste2Energy’s stated valuation, claiming that the intangibles 
were a “dead asset” because the gasification technology “didn’t really 
work.”31    
After an audit, Waste2Energy issued an amended 8-K on October 1, 
2009, stating that its intangible assets were worthless. With the 
gasification technology not performing as planned, management 
 
 19. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1100 (2019). 
 20. Id. at 1099. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Lorenzo v. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, 872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019).  
 25. Gregg C. Lorenzo, Francis V. Lorenzo, and Charles Vista, LLC, Release No. 544, 107 SEC 
Docket 5934, 2013 WL 6858820, at *3 (Dec. 31, 2013).  
 26. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1099. 
 27. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 581. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1099 (2019).  
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determined that the intangible assets “should have been valued at zero.”32 
This left the total asset value of Waste2Energy at $370,552.33 On the same 
day, Waste2Energy also filed a Form 10-Q (“10-Q”) which listed the total 
asset value of the company as $660,408 as of June 30, 2009.34 Lorenzo’s 
secretary alerted him when Waste2Energy filed the amended 8-K..35 The 
next day, Lorenzo emailed all of Charles Vista’s brokers with links to the 
both the 10-Q and 8-K.36  
On October 14, 2009, about two weeks after his secretary alerted him 
to the amended 8-K, Lorenzo was directed by his boss to send two emails 
to prospective investors in the debenture offering.37 Lorenzo’s boss 
supplied the content of the emails, which stated that investing in 
Waste2Energy’s debenture offering had “3 layers of protection: (I) 
[Waste2Energy] has over $10 mm in confirmed assets; (II) 
[Waste2Energy] has purchase orders and LOI's for over $43 mm in 
orders; (III) Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay 
these Debenture holders (if necessary).”38 The emails were signed by 
Lorenzo as “Vice President — Investment Banking,” and directed the 
recipients to call him with any questions.39 The emails did not contain any 
information about Waste2Energy’s asset devaluation.40 The information 
that Lorenzo sent in the emails was “cut and pasted” from information 
that was sent to him by his boss.41  The emails also stated that they were 
sent at the request of the owner of Charles Vista.42 
The SEC brought an administrative action against Lorenzo, his boss, 
and Charles Vista.43 Lorenzo was charged with willfully violating Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a)(1) of 
the Securities Act.44 The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who heard the 
case found that Lorenzo violated the antifraud provisions because the 
emails contained material misstatements and omissions.45 The ALJ noted: 
[T]he evidence shows that [Lorenzo] was reckless–although he knew that 
[Waste2Energy] was in terrible financial shape, he sent the emails without 
 
 32. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 581. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1099 (2019). 
 38. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 581. 
 39. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1099. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1107 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 1099. 
 44. Lorenzo, 2013 WL 6858820, at *6. 
 45. Id. at *7. 
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thinking. Had he taken a minute to read the text, he would have realized 
that it was false and misleading and that [Waste2Energy] was not worth 
anything near what was being represented to potential investors. Also, he 
cannot escape liability by claiming that [his boss] ordered him to send the 
emails. The fact that [his boss] contributed to the misrepresentation does 
not relieve Frank Lorenzo from responsibility.46  
Based on its findings, the ALJ ordered that Lorenzo cease and desist 
from committing or causing future violations of the antifraud 
provisions.47 Additionally, the ALJ ordered Lorenzo to pay a civil money 
penalty of $15,000 and barred him from any further participation in the 
securities industry.48 On review of the ALJ’s order, the SEC affirmed the 
penalties.49 
 Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Lorenzo appealed the 
SEC’s decision.50 Because Rule 10b-5(b) makes it illegal to “make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact,”51  
Lorenzo argued that his boss was the maker of the statements contained 
in the emails, rather than Lorenzo himself.52  Because the emails were 
sent upon order from his boss, and any false information contained therein 
was supplied by his boss, Lorenzo argued that his boss was the maker of 
the statements.53 The definition of maker had previously been interpreted 
in Janus, as will be discussed below in Part IV.54 
IV. RECONCILING LORENZO WITH JANUS 
A. The Court’s Decision on Janus 
Janus involved Janus Capital management (“JCM”), an investment 
advisor for mutual funds.55 JCM was a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus 
Capital Group (“JCG”).56 JCG created the Janus family of mutual funds.57 
The mutual funds were organized in a trust called the Janus Investment 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *10. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Francis V. Lorenzo, SEC Release No. 9762, 111 SEC Docket 1761, 2015 WL 1927763, at *17 
(Apr. 29, 2015).  
 50. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 872 F.3d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2017), aff‘d, 139 S. Ct. 1094 
(2019). 
 51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2007). 
 52. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 587. 
 53. Id. at 587. 
 54. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142-48 (2011). 
 55. Id. at 137.   
 56. Id. at 138. 
 57. Id.  
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Fund.58 The Janus Investment Fund was a separate legal entity from JCG, 
and was owned by mutual fund investors.59 Janus Investment Fund used 
JCM as its investment adviser and fund administrator.60 First Derivative 
Traders (“First Derivative”) was an owner of JCG stock.61 Janus 
Investment Fund stated in its prospectuses that the funds were not suitable 
for market timing.62 The prospectuses alluded to Janus Investment Funds 
creating policies to curb its market timing practices.63  After the 
prospectuses were made public, the New York Attorney General filed a 
lawsuit against JCG and JCM alleging that JCG made secret arrangements 
to allow market timing of JCM funds.64 JCM received a significant part 
of its value from fees paid by Janus Investment Fund that were based on 
the value of the company’s holdings.65 After the allegations became 
known, fund investors withdrew large amounts of money from the 
funds.66 Because the withdrawal caused JCM to lose management fees, 
JCG’s stock value fell by nearly twenty-five percent.67  
First Derivative, as the representative of a class, initiated a private 
action against JCM and JCG, alleging that the two entities “caused mutual 
fund prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and made them 
available to the investing public, which created the misleading impression 
that [JCG and JCM] would implement measures to curb market timing in 
the Janus [mutual funds].”68 The stockholders alleged that this caused 
inflation of JCG’s prices.69 First Derivative further claimed that “JCG and 
JCM ‘materially misled the investing public’” because investors relied on 
the market price as an accurate value of the stock;70 and finally, that JCM 
violated Rule 10b-5 and that JCG was liable for JCM’s actions because it 
was a “controlling person” under Section 20 of the Securities Act.71  
Janus focused on whether JCM itself was the maker of the statements 
contained in the misleading prospectuses.72 The Court first examined 
First Derivative’s claim that the “well-recognized and uniquely close 
 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 140. 
 62. Id. 138-39. 
 63. Id. at 139. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.at 139-40. 
 66. Id. at 139. 
 67. Id. at 140 (citation omitted). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. (citation omitted). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 141. 
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relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser” suggested 
a relationship of influence between Janus Investment Fund and JCM.73 
The Court dismissed First Derivative’s argument that this made JCM a 
“maker” because it would broaden Rule 10b-5’s scope, and create “a 
theory of liability similar to—but broader in application than . . . what 
Congress has already created expressly elsewhere.”74 The Court opined 
that would make an influential relationship equivalent to a controlling 
party.75 Congress had already decided who would be liable as a 
controlling party in Section 20 of the Exchange Act, and declined to 
include a relation of influence.76  
 First Derivative further claimed that JCM was the maker of the 
misleading statement because it had been significantly involved in the 
preparation of the prospectuses. The Court held that “the maker of a 
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the 
statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” 
77 “Without such authority, it is not ‘necessary or inevitable’ that any 
falsehood will be contained in the statement.”78  The Court noted that 
publishing another person’s statement does not render that person a maker 
of the statement.79 To illustrate, the Court noted that “[t]his rule might 
best be exemplified by the relationship between a speechwriter and a 
speaker. Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely 
within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who 
takes credit—or blame—for what is ultimately said.”80 Because only 
Janus Investment Fund had a statutory obligation to create the 
prospectuses, it controlled the content.81 As the controller of the content, 
in alignment with its legal duties, Janus Investment Fund, not JCM, was 
the maker of the statements in the prospectuses.82 The Court also noted 
that its conclusion was consistent with Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,83 which held that Rule 10b-5's 
private right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors.84 
“Such suits—against entities that contribute ‘substantial assistance’ to the 
 
 73. Id. at 145. 
 74. Id. at 146. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 142. 
 78. Id. at 144. 
 79. Id. at 142. 
 80. Id. at 143. 
 81. Id. at 146-47. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Central Bank’s holding that there is not private right of action for aiders 
and abettors of securities violations is discussed infra. 
 84. Janus, 564 U.S. at 143. 
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making of a statement but do not actually make it—may be brought by 
the SEC, but not by private parties.”85 “A broader reading of ‘make,’ 
including persons or entities without ultimate control over the content of 
a statement, would substantially undermine Central Bank.”86 
B. Finding Liability for Non-Makers Disseminating False or Misleading 
Statements 
 The Court in Lorenzo illustrated that Lorenzo was not a maker, as 
defined by Janus, of the false statements in Waste2Energy’s 8-K.87 Using 
the speechwriter analogy, the Court noted that Janus “meant that an 
investment adviser who had merely ‘participat[ed] in the drafting of a 
false statement’ ‘made’ by another could not be held liable in a private 
action under subsection (b) of Rule 10b–5.”88 When examining the case, 
the D.C. Circuit held that Janus foreclosed Lorenzo’s liability under Rule 
10b-5(b).89 To be liable under this subsection, a person must have made 
an untrue statement of material fact in connection with the sale or 
purchase of securities.90  The Court did not question this finding.91 The 
Court agreed that Lorenzo was not the maker of any false statements 
regarding the sale of Waste2Energy debentures.92 Instead, the Court had 
to determine whether Lorenzo could be liable under other parts of Rule 
10b-5 and Section 17(a)(1) for disseminating false statements that were 
made by another person. 93￼  
The Court first focused on Rule 10b-5 Subsections (a) and (c).94 Rule 
10b-5(a) makes it illegal to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud” in connection with the sale or purchase of securities.95 
Violations of this provision are referred to as scheme liability.96  Rule 
10b-5(c) prohibits engaging in fraudulent courses of business in 
connection with the sale or purchase of securities.97  Section 17(a)(1) and 
(3) contain similar prohibitions against scheme liability and fraudulent 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 193 S. Ct. 1094, 1099 (2019). 
 88. Id. at 1098-99, quoting Janus, 564 U.S. 145. 
 89. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 872 F.3d 578, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1094 
(2019). 
 90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2007). 
 91. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1099. 
 92. Id. at 1100. 
 93. Id. at 1099. 
 94. Id. at 1100. 
 95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2007). 
 96. Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have A Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 351, 353 (2009). 
 97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2007). 
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courses of business as those found in Rule 10b-5 sections (a) and (c).98  
The Court did not consider Lorenzo’s liability under Section 17(a)(3) 
because the SEC did not charge him with a violation of that section.99  
 Lorenzo contended that the charge against him related to a false 
statement made in connection with the sale of a security.100 Lorenzo noted 
that  Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 17(a)(2) specifically prohibit false claims, 
and that they are the exclusive section under which he could be 
charged.101 Because the other sections of Rule 10b-5 dealt with fraud 
provisions other than making false statements, allegations under those 
sections are limited to accusations of scheme liability.102 Lorenzo claimed 
that because Subsection (b) is that only part of Rule 10b-5 containing a 
prohibition against making false statements, it is the only section that can 
used to charge for such actions.103 In other words, Lorenzo argued that 
because he was not the maker of the statements, he had not violated Rule 
10b-5(b), and because the case arose from false statements, he had not 
violated the scheme liability sections of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).104  
The Court looked to the language of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) and Section 
17(a)(1).105  Lorenzo had previously admitted that he was skeptical of the 
valuation of Waste2Energys’s intangible valuation prior to sending the 
email directed by his boss,106 and admitted that he knew the gasification 
process did not work.107 Further, Waste2Energy publicly disclosed, and 
Lorenzo was told, that Waste2Energy’s intellectual property was 
worthless and had been written off.108 When the email containing the 
misstatement was sent, Lorenzo knew that Waste2Energy’s assets were 
worth around $370,000, not $10 million in “confirmed assets” as was 
referenced in the emails.109 In applying the rule and statute referencing 
these facts, the Court found that Lorenzo could be primarily liable under 
the scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a).110  In its 
analysis, the Court relied on the plain meaning of the words in those 
provisions.  
 
 98. 15 U.S.C. §77q (a)(1)-(3). 
 99. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1100. 
 100. Id. at 1101. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 1102. 
 104. Id. at 1101. The SEC did not charge Lorenzo with violations of the scheme liability subsections 
of Section 17(a)(2) and (3). 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 1099. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1102. 
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Using expansive dictionary definitions, the Court stated “[a] ‘device,’ 
. . . is simply  ‘[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design’; a  ‘scheme’  
is a  ‘project,’ ‘plan[,] or program of something to be done’; and an “ 
‘artifice’ ” is “ ‘an artful stratagem or trick.’”111 In the Court’s opinion, 
the plain language of Rule 10b-5(c) and Section 17(a)(1) showed that 
Lorenzo’s conduct had violated those provisions.112 Additionally, the 
Court noted that Lorenzo did not challenge the circuit court’s finding that 
he acted with scienter, so it was assumed that his actions were done with 
“intent to deceive, manipulate and defraud.”113 Disseminating false 
statements with such intent was considered by the Court an “artful 
strategy or a plan, devised to defraud an investor.”114 The Court used a 
similar approach when analyzing whether any of Lorenzo’s statements 
violated Rule 10b-5(c). The Court noted that the words “act” and 
“practice” have similarly expansive definitions, and that Lorenzo had 
engaged in an act, practice or course of business that operates as a fraud 
or deceit.115 By doing so, Lorenzo had violated Rule10b-5(c).116  Using 
these expansive definitions to allow for primary liability under those fraud 
provisions, the Court cautioned that determining whether there is a 
violation may be problematic in borderline cases.117 However, the Court 
stated it saw “nothing borderline about this case, where the relevant 
conduct (as found by the [SEC]) consist[ed] of disseminating false or 
misleading information to prospective investors with the intent to 
defraud.”118  
In its discussion, the Court noted that the individual sections of Rule 
10b-5 and Section 17(a) were not mutually exclusive as Lorenzo had 
argued.119 Instead, the Court ruled that the same defendant can be both 
primarily liable under 10b-5(b) as well as secondarily liable under 
Subsections (a) and (c). Lorenzo argued that this would make 120 a “dead 
letter.”￼ In Janus, the Court stated that a person without control of a 
statement “can merely suggest what to say, not ’make‘ a statement in its 
own right. One who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another 
is not its maker.”121 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas agreed with 
 
 111. Id. at 1101, quoting WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 713, 2234, 157 (2d ed. 1934)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. (citation omitted).  
 114. Id. (citation omitted). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
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 119. Id. at 1102. 
 120. Id. at 1103. 
 121. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011). 
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Lorenzo that the Court’s interpretation of 10b-5 liability could not be 
reconciled with Janus.122 The majority, however, distinguished Janus by 
noting that Janus dealt with draft misstatements that were then issued by 
an altogether different entity.123 In that case there was no liability under 
Rule 10b-5(b).124 The Court noted that Janus was silent about Rule 10b-
5(b)’s application to the dissemination of false or misleading information. 
The Court stated that “Janus would remain relevant (and preclude 
liability) where an individual neither makes nor disseminates false 
information—provided, of course, that the individual is not involved in 
some other form of fraud.”125 The dissent opined the majority’s attempt 
to preserve Janus was illusory because its opinion would make 
administrative actions brought because of a misstatement qualify as 
“other forms of fraud”126  
C. Blurring the Line between Primary and Secondary Liability 
Lorenzo also argued that permitting liability for disseminating false 
information by a person other than the maker would blur the line between 
primary liability and secondary liability for securities fraud.127 Lorenzo 
argued that Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, which regulates aiding and 
abetting a securities fraud, addresses secondary liability.128 Section 20(e) 
gives liability to secondary violators as if they were primary violators in 
SEC enforcement actions, stating: 
[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance 
to another person in violation of a provision of [the Exchange Act] , or of 
any rule or regulation issued under[the Exchange Act], shall be deemed to 
be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom 
such assistance is provided.129 
 Lorenzo averred that allowing his conduct to be considered a primary 
violation Rule 10b-5 would “erase or weaken” the clear distinction 
between primary and secondary liability in Exchange Act violations.130 
Lorenzo argued, and the dissent agreed, that Janus “drew a clear line 
between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement 
 
 122. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1107 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch joined Justice Thomas 
in his dissenting opinion. 
 123. Id. at 1103. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 1110 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 1103. 
 128. Id.  
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2011). 
 130. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1103. 
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cases.”131 The dissent opined that a person who lacks ultimate authority 
over a statement does not make the statement and therefore cannot be 
primarily liable.132 The person, however, could be found liable as an aider 
and abettor under principles of secondary liability.133 The dissent opined 
that allowing for a person who is not a maker to be primarily liable for a 
fraudulent misstatement “eviscerates” the distinction created by Janus.134 
In doing so, the dissent also accused the majority of misconstruing 
securities law and subverting precedent in a way that has “far-reaching 
consequences.”135 The dissent alleged that the majority did what the Court 
declined to do in Janus, which is to impose broad liability for fraudulent 
misstatements, leaving aiding and abetting “almost nonexistent.”136  
The majority distinguished Janus noting that the Court did not believe 
its decision had the effect of weakening the distinction between primary 
and secondary liability.137 The Court noted that it is not unusual for the 
same action to lead to liability for the actor to be an aider and abettor 
regarding one offense, and being primarily liable for another.138 It used 
the example that “John…might sell Bill an unregistered firearm in order 
to help Bill rob a bank, under circumstances that make him primarily 
liable for the gun sale and secondarily liable for the bank robbery.”139 The 
dissent responded by claiming that the majority’s example dealt with two 
separate and distinct offenses. Lorenzo is different, the dissent claimed, 
because the majority’s example uses two distinct crimes with different 
punishments.140  The Court’s interpretation would use subsections of a 
statute, Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), to eliminate limitations in a neighboring 
provision of the same law, Rule 10b-5(b).141 Further, the dissent noted 
that this interpretation could not only be used in SEC enforcement actions, 
but could also lead to a non-maker who assisted in making a misstatement 
being open to private lawsuits.142 In Central Bank of Denver, NA v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, the Court specifically disallowed private rights 
of actions against secondary violators under Rule 10b-5.143 Lorenzo and 
 
 131. Id. at 1105-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 132. Id. at 1106. 
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 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
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the dissent argued that this would drastically change the landscape of 
private securities litigation.144 
V. THE IMPACT OF LORENZO ON PRECEDENT 
 Over the last several decades, there has been a trend towards limiting 
actions against securities issuers.145 Commenters were varied in their 
opinions on how the Lorenzo decision would affect this trend. Most seem 
to agree that the decision will make SEC enforcement actions more 
common.146 However, Lorenzo’s impact on private litigation invites more 
disputes.147 Lorenzo and the dissent make two fundamental claims. First, 
a question arises as to whether Lorenzo blurs or eliminates the distinction 
between primary and secondary liability under the Exchange Act. Second, 
allowing liability for people who are not makers of false or misleading 
statements under the scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5 would 
greatly increase the scope of coverage of the rule. Lorenzo cited two 
Supreme Court cases to bolster his position that allowing for him to have 
primary liability would end, or at least substantially diminish, the 
distinction between primary and secondary liability: Central Bank of 
Denver and Stoneridge.148  
A. Lorenzo’s effect on Central Bank of Denver 
Although the SEC brought action against Lorenzo’s boss as well,, 
Lorenzo was not charged with aiding and abetting his boss’s violations.149 
Instead, he was charged with primary liability under Rule 10b-5.  
Charging Lorenzo with primary liability is significant because Central 
Bank of Denver held that the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 did 
not extend to aiders and abettors.150  Prior to Central Bank, many courts 
 
 144. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1104. 
 145. Joel C. Haims et al., Does ‘Lorenzo’ Expand the Scope of Private Securities Litigation?, N.Y. 
L.J. (May 31, 2019). 
 146. See, e.g., JAY B. SYKES , CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10293, LIES AND SCHEMES: SUPREME 
COURT EXPANDS SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY  (Apr. 29, 2019), available at 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10293.;  Joshua G. Hamilton, et al., Supreme Court 
Ruling Extends Reach of Primary Liability for Securities Fraud, 2480 LATHAM & WATKINS CLIENT 
ALERT (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/Supreme-Court-Ruling-Extends-Reach-
of-Primary-Liability-for-Securities-Fraud; and Martin J. Crisp, David Hennes & R. Daniel O’Connor, 
Lorenzo v. SEC: Expanded Scope of Securities Fraud Liability, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (APR. 
14, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/14/lorenzo-v-sec-expanded-scope-of-securities-
fraud-liability/. 
 147. See, e.g., Id. But see, e.g., Haims et al., supra note 145. 
 148. Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1104. 
 149. Id. at 1106 (Thomas J., dissenting). 
 150. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
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allowed for private rights of action for aiding and abetting securities 
violations.151 Central Bank revolved around investments in the Colorado 
Springs–Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (the “Authority”).152 In 
1986 and 1988 the Authority issued a total of $26 million worth of bonds 
to finance improvements to a planned residential and commercial 
development in Colorado Springs.153 Central Bank of Denver served as 
indenture trustee for the bonds.154 The bonds were secured by liens on 
land and contained a covenant requiring that the value of the land must be 
at worth at least 160% of the bonds.155 Due to declining property values 
in the area, there were allegations the property values did not meet the 
required amount.156  To evaluate these concerns, Central Bank of Denver 
first conducted an in-house appraisal of the land.157 The in-house 
appraiser recommended that the bank get an outside appraisal.158 Central 
Bank of Denver delayed reviewing the outside appraisal until six months 
after the bond closing dates.159  The Authority defaulted on the bonds 
prior to Central Bank conducting its independent review of the 
appraisal.160  The respondents had purchased $2.1 million dollars of the 
bonds.161  The respondents sued the underwriters of the bonds and 
claimed that Central Bank of Denver, by delaying the review of a 
suspicious appraisal, was an aider and abettor to the underwriters’ 
violation and were therefore also liable under §10(b).162 
Using the wording of the statue, the Court found that Central Bank of 
Denver could not be held liable for aiding and abetting because Section 
10(b) did not allow such private rights of action.163 The Court noted that 
Congress could have specifically allowed for those type of lawsuits when 
drafting the statute.164  In its discussion the Court held that Section 10(b) 
“prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or 
the commission of a manipulative act.”165  If the Court allowed for a 
private right of action for aiding and abetting, it would be tantamount to 
 
 151. Haims et al., supra note 145. 
 152. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 167. 
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judicially created law.166  In its opinion, the Court “could not amend the 
statute to create liability for acts that are not themselves deceptive within 
the meaning of the statute.”167   The Court did note that aiding and abetting 
“ought to be actionable” at times, but it was not the purview of the 
judiciary to create policy.168   The Court, however, gave a strong warning 
that there are times secondary actors may still be liable under the 
securities laws.169  The Court stated that:  
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who 
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or 
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable 
as a primary violator under 10b–5, assuming all of the requirements for 
primary liability under Rule 10b–5 are met.170 
The Court articulated the necessary requirements for a private party to 
state a claim under Rule 10b-5 in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Boudo.171 
Dura Pharmaceuticals laid out a six-part test to determine whether a 
private party would have a claim under section 10(b).172  It was 
determined, by summarizing previous cases, that the required elements 
are: 
(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; 
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or 
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.173  
After Central Bank, a split arose in the federal circuits as to whether a 
private party can recover under a theory of scheme liability.  The Ninth 
Circuit took the position in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner  that “conduct 
by a defendant that had the principal purpose and effect of creating a 
false appearance in deceptive transactions as part of a scheme to 
defraud is conduct that uses or employs a deceptive device within the 
meaning of § 10(b).”174 The Simpson decision noted that Central Bank 
did not allow for private recovery for aiding and abetting liability, but 
it did caution that secondary actors may still be liable as a primary 
violator under Section 10(b).175  
The Eighth Circuit, in In re Charter Communications Inc. Securities 
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 170. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 171. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
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Litigation176, took a more limiting approach to Central Bank. The Eighth 
Circuit stated that Central Bank stood for three principles.177 First, there 
is a categorical declaration that private plaintiffs may not bring a case for 
acts that Section 10(b) does not specifically prohibit.178 Second, absent 
some misstatement or a failure to disclose by a person who has a duty to 
disclose, a device or contrivance is not deceptive.179 Third, the term 
“manipulative” in Section 10(b) is limited to illegal trading practices such 
as wash sales, matched orders or rigged pricing intended to mislead 
investors.180  Applying these principles, the Eighth Circuit stated that 
“any defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be made a 
fraudulent misstatement or omission, or who does not directly engage in 
manipulative securities trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding and 
abetting and cannot be held liable under § 10(b) or any subpart of Rule 
10b-5.”181 The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach to the Eight’s 
Circuit’s interpretation of Central Bank in Regents of the University of 
California v. Credit Suisse First Boston.182  
B. Lorenzo’s effect on Stoneridge 
In Stoneridge, the Court addressed the split in the circuits by granting 
certiorari to review In re Charter Communications.183 Although not 
necessary for its holding, in Central Bank, the Court noted that element 
of reliance was missing.184 The Court noted the plaintiffs could not show 
that they relied on Central Bank of Denver’s misstatement or omission.185  
The Court did not offer much analysis why the Central Bank plaintiffs 
lacked  reliance, but it is presumably because the case was premised on 
Central Bank of Denver’s inaction in timely performing an appraisal. It 
was not based on a misstatement or omission in connection with the sale 
or purchase of securities so there was no statement to rely on. The Court 
noted that there were no allegations that Central Bank of Denver 
committed a “deceptive or manipulative act within the meaning of Section 
10(b).”186 Instead, it was only claimed that Central Bank was secondarily 
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liable for aiding abetting the fraud.187 As such, the Court stated that 
“because of [its] conclusion that there is no private aiding and abetting 
liability under § 10(b), Central Bank may not be held liable as an aider 
and abettor.”188  
The Court delved further into the reliance requirement in Stoneridge 
than it did in Central Bank.  Stoneridge involved a class action lawsuit 
filed by investors in Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”), a cable 
television supplier.189  The lead plaintiff was Stoneridge Investment 
Partners (“Stoneridge Partners”), a group of investors in Charter.190  
Charter was involved in a scheme with two of its suppliers, Scientific 
Atlanta and Motorola. 191 To meet Charter’s quarterly financial estimates, 
“it misclassif[ied] . . . its customer base; delayed reporting of terminated 
customers; improper[ly] capitaliz[ed] costs that should have been shown 
as expenses; and manipulate[ed] . . . the company's billing cutoff dates to 
inflate reported revenues.”192 Scientific Atlanta and Motorola supplied 
cable boxes for Charter.193 Scientific Atlanta and Motorola entered into 
an arrangement with Charter where Charter would overpay for cable 
boxes, and the overpayment would then be used for Scientific Atlanta and 
Motorola to purchase advertising at an inflated rate back from Charter.194 
In violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, Charter 
recorded the advertising as revenue and capitalized the purchase of the 
cable boxes.195  These agreements allowed Charter to inflate its revenue 
and cash flow by approximately $17 million.196  The transactions allowed 
Charter to fool its auditors into approving financial statements that met 
revenue expectations.197 Stoneridge Partners lost money on stock 
purchases in Charter, and brought the private action alleging violations of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.198   
 The Court noted that a deceptive act in a private right of action under 
Rule 10b-5 does not necessarily have to be from a statement or 
omission.199 Conduct itself could be deceptive.200 The Court, as it did in 
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Central Bank noted that private rights of actions under Section 10b are 
not permitted in cases against aiders and abettors.201 However, the Court 
did note that conduct of a secondary actor may be deceptive, and therefore 
actionable, if all of the elements of Rule 10b-5 are present.202 The Court 
focused on whether the reliance element of Rule 10b-5 was met.203 
Reliance is met when the “requisite causal connection between a 
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury” exists.204 The Court 
noted that there were two circumstances in which a rebuttable 
presumption of liability can occur under Section 10(b).205 First, when 
there is an omission of a material fact by a person with a duty to disclose, 
the investor to whom the duty is owed does not need to prove specific 
proof of reliance.206 Second, if a deception becomes public, reliance can 
be met using the fraud-on-the-market theory.207 The fraud-on-the market 
theory was created in Basic v. Levinson, which stated: 
[I]n an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s 
stock is determined by the available material information regarding the 
company and its business . . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud 
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements . . . . The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud 
and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant 
than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.208  
 The fraud-on-the market theory assumes that markets are efficient and, 
therefore, all public information is built into the price of a security.209 This 
creates a rebuttable presumption that a purchaser of securities can rely on 
the market price of a security as a proxy of all public information about 
the security.210 The Court in Stoneridge noted that Scientific Atlanta and 
Motorola had no duty to disclose its deceptive acts, nor were the deceptive 
acts communicated to the public.211 The Court opined that without direct 
reliance between Stoneridge Partners and the deceptive act, the requisite 
causal connection, and therefore the reliance element of Rule 10b-5, could 
not be met.212  The Court also examined whether scheme liability would 
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make Scientific Atlanta and Motorola, although secondary actors, 
primarily liable using the fraud-on-the-market theory.213 Stoneridge 
Partners argued that because of the efficiency of the markets, the market 
price of the stock that it purchased reflected the Scientific Atlanta and 
Motorola’s deception.214 The Court noted that if reliance were met under 
the fraud-on-the-market theory, “the implied cause of action would reach 
the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does business.”215 
The Court specified that there was no authority to expand the reach of 
Section 10(b) in this way. Further, the Court noted that even if  causation 
could be found in that way,  the deception was not “in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security” as required by Section 10(b).216 
VI. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AFTER LORENZO 
Certainly, the Lorenzo opinion will be an aid to the SEC in enforcement 
actions. Allowing for a person to be primarily liable under the scheme 
liability provisions of Rule 10b-5 will give the SEC another weapon in 
these actions. One comment noted that “it [is not] surprising that the 
Supreme Court believes that the SEC is able to bring a case against an 
individual that knowingly disseminates a fraudulent statement in 
connection with a securities transaction.”217 This is especially important 
when a person, like Lorenzo, was a vice president of an investment 
banking firm. Lorenzo, although not the maker of a misstatement, 
knowingly distributed those misstatements to potential clients.218  
Further, Lorenzo knew that people receiving the statements would use 
them in their decisions on whether to purchase securities.219  Interestingly, 
the primary basis of Lorenzo’s appeal to the D.C. Circuit was that he 
lacked scienter, and therefore that required element of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 would be missing.220 The D.C Circuit rejected the lack of 
intent argument.221 In the Supreme Court, Lorenzo’s defense focused 
primarily on the fact that he was not the maker of the misstatements, and 
he did not challenge the D.C. Circuit’s finding that he acted with 
scienter.222 By doing so, the SEC could assume that, in Lorenzo’s case, 
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he sent the emails with the intent to deceive the potential investors.223 
With the emails being sent in connection with the sale or purchase of 
securities, and assuming the intent to deceive, it is easy to see that the 
SEC would like to quell that type of behavior. SEC enforcement actions 
will be aided by the fact that the Court held the different subsections of 
Rule 10b-5 were not mutually exclusive.224 This ruling provides a path 
for the SEC to act on claims of scheme liability to be made for the 
dissemination of a false statement by one who is not the maker of the 
statement. However, in order to do so, all the requisite requirements of 
primary liability under Rule 10b-5 must be met.225  The Court in Lorenzo 
also noted that the SEC does not have to meet the element of reliance in 
its enforcement actions in order to prove liability under Rule 10b-5.226 
Private plaintiffs, however, do need to prove that they relied on the 
defendant’s action to be successful in a lawsuit.227   
 The Court, by requiring that all of the elements of Rule 10b-5 must 
be met in order for a secondary party to be liable as a primary violator, is 
likely  signaling that these cases may only be brought against the most 
egregious violators.228  However, the Court gave few parameters as to 
how much involvement and what level of control a non-maker must have 
over a statement that is disseminated to be considered primarily liable for 
fraud.229 The Court admits that applying primary liability for secondary 
actors may “present difficult in problems of scope in borderline cases.”230 
The Court however did not think that Lorenzo’s actions were borderline. 
The Court stated that  Lorenzo, with the intent to defraud, “sent false 
statements directly to investors, invited them to follow up with questions, 
and did so in his capacity as vice president of an investment banking 
company.”231  The Court noted that there would be people who are 
tangentially involved in the dissemination of a fraudulent statement where 
liability would be inappropriate.232 An example given is a mailroom 
clerk.233 Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Lorenzo, took umbrage with this 
characterization, stating that “[t]he fact that Lorenzo ‘sent false 
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statements directly to investors’ in e-mails that ‘invited [investors] to 
follow up with questions,’ puts him in precisely the same position as a 
secretary asked to send an identical message from her e-mail account.”234 
But the Court gives no further example of the difference between 
tangential involvement and primary liability. The difference will likely be 
decided in future enforcement actions.  
VII. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AFTER LORENZO 
The impact of Lorenzo on private securities actions is more ambiguous 
than it is on enforcement actions. The dissent in Lorenzo opined that the 
majority blurs the line between primary liability and secondary liability 
in fraudulent misstatement cases.235 The distinction is important because 
there is no private right of action against aiders and abettors.236 Thus, the 
SEC can bring a larger variety of actions than private plaintiffs. Shortly 
after Central Bank, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).237 The PSLRA specifically empowered 
the SEC to bring actions for aiding and abetting.238 By not giving private 
plaintiffs the same ability, it appears Congress ratified the holding in 
Central Bank that there is no private right of action for aiding and 
abetting.239  Because Lorenzo was based on an SEC enforcement action, 
the Court did not address the effect of  blurring or eliminating the 
distinction between primary liability and secondary liability on private 
plaintiffs. It does appear that private plaintiffs are now able to bring cases 
that would previously be considered aiding and abetting cases. As one 
comment noted, “[b]y effectively converting [a secondary] claim to a 
direct claim, Lorenzo added a powerful arrow to the quiver of the 
plaintiffs’ bar.”240 Certainly, Lorenzo allows for primary liability under 
Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5. However, the effectiveness of this 
new arrow in the quiver has yet to be determined. While the holding in 
Lorenzo seems expansive on its face, the impact on private rights of action 
will be limited by previous Supreme Court precedent. It will also be 
limited by the requirement that all of the elements of primary liability 
must be met. The Court in Lorenzo relied on language from Central Bank 
in holding that “even a bit participant in the securities markets ‘may be 
liable as a primary violator under [Rule] 10b–5’ so long as ‘all of the 
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requirements for primary liability . . . are met.’”241 This point was 
reiterated in Stoneridge as well, which stated that “the implied [private] 
right of action in § 10(b) continues to cover secondary actors who commit 
primary violations.”242 Future case law will need to define  the framework 
for determining those who are only providing substantial assistance to 
another allowing only aiding and abetting liability, and those who have 
primary liability.243 The line may be blurred between the two and people 
may be found liable for a primary violation where, prior to Lorenzo, they 
would only been aiders and abettors of a securities fraud.244 However, the 
impact of Lorenzo is limited by precedent, making two of the required 
elements for a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 difficult to prove: 
scienter and reliance.  
A. Proving Scienter 
In the Supreme Court, Lorenzo did not dispute that he acted with 
scienter. If Lorenzo did challenge the finding of scienter, the Court would 
have had to show specifically how the scienter requirement was met, as 
the PLSRA requires that scienter be pleaded with particularity.245 Rule 
10b-5’s scienter requirement was recognized by the Court in Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder.246 Ernst & Ernst held that scienter in the context of 
Rule 10b-5 was the “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”247 Courts 
have adopted a recklessness standard of proof to meet the scienter 
requirement.248  It is likely that the SEC did not doubt its ability to prove 
that Lorenzo acted with scienter, or it would have likely added violations 
of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3), which only have a negligence standard for 
enforcement.249 The D.C. Circuit did analyze Lorenzo’s scienter in 
disseminating the false statements.250 The court addressed many facts to 
show that Lorenzo acted with either an “intent to deceive or defraud, or 
extreme recklessness to that effect.”251 It was noted that one of Lorenzo’s 
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chief duties involved conducting due diligence inquiries on his clients. 
Lorenzo stated that he knew that Waste2Energy’s gasification technology 
did not work  before he disseminated the false statement with valuations 
that he knew were incorrect.252 It was also shown that Lorenzo enticed 
people to purchase Waste2Energy’s debenture based on an assertion that 
there was already a large purchase of the securities.253 However, this was 
not based on a purchase agreement, but on a letter of intent that did not 
create an obligation to purchase the securities.254  
The Court in Lorenzo clearly stated that “those who disseminate false 
statements with intent to defraud are primarily liable under Rules 10b-
5(a) and (c), § 10(b), and § 17(a)(1), even if they are secondarily liable 
under Rule 10b-5(b).”255 In Geoffrey A. Orley Revocable Trust U/A/D 
1/26/2000 v. Genovese, the Southern District of New York distinguished 
the facts in that case from those in Lorenzo.256 However, in doing so, the 
court stated “even though [Lorenzo] had not ‘made’ the underlying 
language, he could nevertheless be held liable through a private suit 
brought under paragraphs (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 because he 
disseminated the language with the intent to defraud.”257 This presages 
that many cases will likely turn on a factual examination of whether the 
defendant acted with scienter.  The scienter requirement will likely keep 
future litigants from reaching potential defendants who are not closely 
related to the false statements in question. Justice Thomas asserted that a 
secretary who knowingly disseminated false information would be in the 
same position as Lorenzo. However, because of the normal duties and 
responsibilities of a secretary or mailroom clerk, it is unlikely that the 
actions of these individuals were done in a manner that meets the scienter 
requirement. Considering the Court’s pronouncement that liability would 
be inappropriate for those only tangentially involved in disseminating as 
false statement,258 the duties of those involved would likely be considered 
in future litigation. It seems hard to conflate intent equally with a person 
in Lorenzo’s position, a vice president of an investment banking 
company, who had due diligence duties and expertise in the analysis of 
financial records of a company, with a secretary or a mailroom clerk that 
had no similar duties, credentials or responsibilities. While it was shown 
that Lorenzo acted with scienter, a secretary or mailroom clerk 
disseminating information does not necessarily intend to deceive the 
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recipient of the information. Rather, that person is likely acting as a 
conduit in disseminating the statement of an employer and likely does not 
examine the veracity of the statement.  
One could imagine a scenario where a secretary had responsibilities 
similar to those of an executive like Lorenzo, but that would likely be 
rare. Further, a person in Lorenzo’s position would stand to financially 
gain from the fraudulent misconduct, giving reason to have the intent to 
deceive; whereas a secretary or mailroom clerk would probably not. It 
would be hard to imagine a court finding that a secretary or a mailroom 
clerk who sent a message acted with a level of recklessness sufficient to 
meet the scienter requirement merely by relaying a message over which 
they have no control or responsibility, nor any financial incentive to 
deceive the recipient.  
Central Bank specifically warned that there can be primary liability 
attributed to lawyers, accountants, and bankers that are secondary actors 
if all the requirements of Rule 10b-5 are met.259  These types of 
professionals have more control over statements that are often 
disseminated in their name. They are often compiling information 
including statements made by other people. However, because of their 
expertise, it is expected that they operate with more care and 
responsibility than a secretary or mailroom clerk for the information that 
they send to people who will use the statements in a decision to purchase 
or sell securities. The amount of control a person has over a statement will 
likely determine whether scienter can be found for secondary actors to 
determine if primary liability can be found.  
B. Proving Reliance 
Further cases will probably also be decided based on the element of 
reliance. In Lorenzo, the court did not address reliance as it is not a 
necessary element of an SEC enforcement action.260 The Court in 
Stoneridge specifically rejected a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance 
in scheme liability cases, as it would be an improper expansion of the 
scope of Section 10(b).261 Without the fraud-on-the-market theory of 
reliance, a plaintiff would have to show a direct causal connection 
between a defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's injury.262 
Allowing for a fraud-on-the market theory would make “any aider and 
abettor liable under § 10(b) if he or she committed a deceptive act in the 
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process of providing assistance.”263 This would go beyond limits that the 
Court found in Central Bank and Congress affirmed in the PSLRA.264 
The fraud-on-the-market theory has aided plaintiffs in meeting the 
reliance requirement for many securities class actions because it can be 
used to show reliance across the entire class.265 Prior to the fraud-on-the 
market theory, each plaintiff would have to show a direct causal 
connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's 
injury.266 Similar to an examination of the scienter requirement, reliance 
would distinguish those that were tangentially involved in a fraud versus 
those who had primary liability. The defendants in Stoneridge had no 
primary liability because although they aided in the fraud, the investing 
public did not directly rely on the fraudulent conduct. The defendants had 
no duty to disclose any information about the fraud and the fraudulent 
acts were not distributed to the public.267 It would be easier for a plaintiff 
to show reliance on a person in someone like Lorenzo’s position than a 
person who was a secretary or a mailroom clerk. Stoneridge makes it 
likely that plaintiffs would have to show reliance on the conduct of a 
particular defendant for that defendant to have primary liability. This 
would limit many class action lawsuits because, without being able to 
presume reliance using the fraud-on-the-market theory, all the members 
of the class would have had to rely on the same false statement or 
omission. 
The Court in Lorenzo stated that those who are only tangentially 
involved in a fraud should not have primary liability for the fraud.268 
However, the Court also quoted Central Bank stating that “even a bit 
participant in the securities markets ‘may be liable as a primary violator 
under [Rule] 10b–5’ so long as ‘all of the requirements for primary 
liability . . .  are met.’”269 No reference was made to the difference 
between tangential involvement and a bit participant, other than stating 
that mailroom clerks should not have liability and Lorenzo should. 
However, it appears that the Court is allowing for scheme liability to be 
the basis of primary liability, not only for the information that was sent in 
the emails, but also for the overall actions causing misinformation to be 
disseminated. Reliance is defined as “dependence or trust by a person, 
esp[ecially] when combined with action based on that dependence or 
 
 263. Id. at 162. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Note, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2019). 
 266. Stoneridge, 552 U.S at 159. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1101 (2019). 
 269. Id. at 1104. 
26
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/1
2020] LORENZO V. SEC: BLURRING THE LINE… 27 
trust.”270 By emphasizing that Lorenzo disseminated “false statements 
directly to investors, invited them to follow up with questions, and did so 
in his capacity as vice president of an investment banking company,” it 
appears as if the Court is allowing that the disseminated information be 
relied upon as if Lorenzo had himself made the statement.   
Lorenzo was interpreted in In Re Longfin Corp. Securities Class Action 
Litigation.271  The court in Longfin denied dismissal of a Rule 10b-5 class 
action where it was alleged that an underwriter facilitated a securities 
issuance and exchange listing knowing that the issuance was outside of 
regulatory compliance. While Longfin did not address reliance, it noted 
that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive, and so liability under § 10(b) or 
Rule 10b-5 does not require a specific oral or written statement.”272  This 
seems to indicate that there could be reliance on the dissemination of 
misinformation if the person who received the information would 
perceive, from the facts surrounding the sending of the statement, that the 
disseminator had control over the statement.  In Lorenzo, the receivers of 
the messages would have had reason to trust that Lorenzo had vetted the 
information contained in the messages. This would allow an inference that 
Lorenzo had the level of control over the statement that the Court required 
in Janus. Janus focused on who controlled the content of the information. 
It appears that Lorenzo would allow a non-maker who knowingly 
disseminated false information to create primary liability if the 
disseminator should be relied upon. If a message containing a 
misrepresentation was disseminated by a mailroom clerk, the receiver 
might rely on the information, but not necessarily think that it was 
scrutinized for accuracy. Nor would a receiver likely rely on the mailroom 
clerk’s analysis of the information contained in the message, even if the 
mailroom clerk had reason to believe that the message contained a 
misrepresentation.  Instead, the reliance would be on the person who had 
control of the message and allowed it to be disseminated.   
In Janus, the Court used the analogy that a speechwriter who drafts a 
speech does not control the content of that speech.273 Instead, the speaker 
has control over the statement and therefore takes the credit or blame for 
the content of the speech.274 The Court noted in Janus that “in the ordinary 
case, attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding 
circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by—and only 
by—the party to whom it is attributed.”275 This is because people do not 
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rely on the action of the speechwriter when interpreting the content of the 
speech. People rely on the speaker because the credentials and knowledge 
of the speaker give the speaker control over the information in the speech. 
Lorenzo was acting in a similar fashion to a person delivering a speech. 
Although he did not make the statements in the message, because of the 
wording of the information sent, along with other factors such as his 
position as vice president and his credentials as a director of a registered 
broker-dealer, the statements should be attributed to him. As such, the 
receivers should be able to rely on the information contained in the 
message. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Lorenzo decision expands the reach of SEC enforcement actions 
by adding a new weapon: it allows for primary liability for a disseminator 
who is not a maker of a statement. Lorenzo allows a person to be charged 
as a primary violator using scheme liability provisions found in 10b-5 
sections (a) and (c), and under Section 17(a). This would eliminate the 
fear, laid out by the Court in Lorenzo, that finding secondary liability can 
prove illusory in cases where the maker of a false or misleading statement 
has not violated Rule 10b-5(b). 276  Not allowing a person to be primarily 
liable in a scheme liability case would allow a person, even one who is 
knowingly engaged in an egregious fraud, to escape liability for aiding 
and abetting. This is because an aider and abettor can only be charged 
where there is a primary violator.277 Further, the aider and abettor can 
only be found liable for the violation to the same extent as the person with 
primary liability.278 However, SEC enforcement actions do not require all 
of the same elements as a private right of action. Section 17(a)(1) does 
not require proof of scienter in enforcement actions. Neither Rule 10b-5 
nor Section 17(a) require that the SEC show reliance in enforcement 
actions.  
The impact of Lorenzo on private rights of action has yet to be 
determined. The Court in Lorenzo expanded, but did not overturn, 
Janus.279 Even though the Janus defendant helped draft the statement at 
issue, the defendant did not participate in its dissemination. The Court 
found no liability under Rule 10b-5 because the defendant who drafted 
the statement did not control the content of the statement and, therefore, 
was not the maker of the statement.  Lorenzo expands Janus in that it 
allows liability for those who either make or disseminate a misstatement. 
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The question of how much control over a statement and how much 
involvement in the dissemination is needed for liability to be triggered 
will need to be determined in future cases. The Court offered little 
analysis on the distinction between someone who has primary liability in 
the dissemination of misleading information and a person who is 
peripherally involved in the fraud. To determine the difference, future 
cases will likely be decided using a factual analysis of the elements of 
scienter and reliance, both of which are required in private actions under 
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